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ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS 
Anthony J. Cascardi (ed.), Literature and the Question of Philosophy, Balti 
more : The John Hopkins University Press, 1987, 333 p. 
Suppose one took seriously either Platonism or Cartesianism in their purest 
and most codified forms. Understanding of proper conduct either in life generally 
(as Plato holds) or in science more narrowly (as Descartes holds) is seen as fiilly 
achievable, through proper dialectical or meditative attention to the Good or to 
God. Philosophy itself then appears as the autonomous discipline of maintaining 
this attention and securing this understanding, uncontaminated by the contingen 
cies of either historical fact or individual desire. History and literature are seen 
as subordinate disciplines, concerned respectively with what has accidentally 
happened and with which writings have chanced to please us. Philosophy as the 
systematic discipline of wisdom can on its own tell us how best to get on with 
things. 
Now suppose instead that the Platonic and Cartesian systems, along with their 
competitor kin, have fallen under suspicion. Historically, reflective people have 
not agreed that any one of these systems embodies a secured understanding of 
wisdom. The very articulation of philosophical systems itself cornes to be seen as 
an activity shaped by historical contingences and the idiosyncratic desires of their 
creators for reknown and authority. Philosophical thinking is no longer regarded 
as the natural product of reflective intelligence. The very idea of a universally apt 
and secured understanding of wisdom is now regarded as a fantasy. 
In this latter situation, what are we then to make of philosophizing and its 
products? Démarcation disputes between philosophy and literature become 
inévitable. Are philosophical texts now simply to be read as literature, with canny 
critics now uncovering for us their pleasures, their contradictory rhetorics, and 
the forces of their authors' secret desires ? Or may the procédures of literary 
critics still be subjected to philosophical scrutiny, themselves assessed as objec 
tively wise or unwise ? What would now count as seriousness in the study of texts 
and in the conduct of life ? 
The essays collected in Literature and the Question of Philosophy represent 
widely varying efforts to articulate and sustain answers to these questions. Each 
contributor recognizes that our historical situation is one in which wide confi 
dence in any particular version of philosophy as an autonomous, self-founding 
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discipline of wisdom is unlikely to be forthcoming. The contributors offer what 
the editor aptly calls various "revisions of foundationalism," in which suspicion 
of the autonomy of philosophy has lead to the thought that "literature and 
philosophy are not separable enterprises" (xvi-xvii). These various revisions of 
(foundational) philosophy, and hence replottings of our possibilities for 
seriousness, fall into two rough groups. 
1) Postmodern ist Textualism ·. In the wake of the apparent collapse of systema 
tic, autonomous philosophy, there is a natural temptation to take philosophical 
texts as objects of literary criticism. If wisdom is not formulable or teachable, then 
texts that claim to formulate and teach wisdom must instead do something 
diiferent. Perhaps they express unrealizable fantasies of authority, or perhaps they 
reflect and perpetuate material class idéologies, or perhaps they simply reflect the 
incoherencies and indeterminacies that must (it might be argued) trouble any 
eifort at assured expression, so long as the formulation of wisdom is not possible. 
Philosophical texts are then seen as objects for unmasking and diagnosis, 
psychoanalytic, material historical, or deconstructionist, depending on the variety 
of critical intelligence that is favored. The interest of philosophical texts resides 
in how they fail to be philosophy, in one way or another. 
This position is taken up, in varying styles and with varying urgencies, in six 
of the thirteen essays of the volume, those by Harry Berger, Jr., Dalia Judovitz, 
Peter McCormick, Berel Lang, David Halliburton, and Mary Wiseman. The 
argument for this position is initiated, as seems appropriate, through the critical 
reading of the texts of philosophy that have been most seriously taken to 
inaugurate autonomous and disciplined courses of philosophical investigation, 
the central texts of Plato and Descartes. Thus Harry Berger, Jr., reads Plato as 
a kind of arch-deconstructionist avant la lettre, whose dialogues are marked by 
an overriding awareness of, in de Man's phrase, "the fundamentally 'rhetorical 
nature of literary language"' (95). As Berger reads them, Plato's dialogues 
continually depict an ineliminable partiality of understanding displayed by 
Socrates' interlocutors, a partiality that testifies to the général informulability of 
wisdom, by Socrates, by Plato, by us as readers, or by anyone who seeks after a 
systematic discipline of wisdom. Contrary to both analytical philosophers, who 
concern themselves with a fiction called 'Plato's metaphysical system' that they 
abstract from the complexities of the text, and contrary to Straussians, who still 
see in the dialogues dramatic closures involving scenes of the transmission of a 
secret wisdom, and contrary even to Derrida, who is held to have reified Plato 
as the author of a coherent metaphysics of presence. Berger holds that the 
dialogues are fiilly literary, where this means that they display "the structural 
inadequacy and ethical dangers inherent in any method of teaching ... committed 
to the dramatic or logocentric level of discourse and grounded in the speaking 
presence of institutional actors" (96). 
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Similarly, in commenting on both Plato and Descartes, Dalia Judovitz obser 
ves that "the différence of style haunts the very définition of philosophy as a 
discipline proper" (49). When Plato and Descartes seek to mark absolute 
différences of style between philosophy, with its seriousness and concern for 
metaphysical and moral discovery, and literature, with its excessive projections 
and playfolness, they are in fact then betrayed by "the metaphorical and rhetorical 
intervention of poetry at the very heart of philosophy" (49) ; the texts of 
philosophy are founded on fictionalizing inventiveness and rhetorical maneuver, 
not wisdom and discovery. (Berger sees Plato as knowing this and celebrating it, 
while Judovitz sees Plato and Descartes as seeking and failing to repress this fact.) 
Hence criticism focusing on rhetoric, or deconstruction in the style of de Man, 
becomes the appropriate mode of the reception of these texts, and of philosophy 
in général. 
This sort of stance is carried on by Peter McCormick, who echoes Judovitz in 
arguing that philosophy cannot be distinguished from literature either as contain 
ing specific linguistic markers or as stemming from a distinctive, nonfictionalizing 
speech act. If neither semantics nor speech act theory can distinguish philosophy 
from literature, then the only hope of discovering a fondamental différence lies 
in seeing philosophy and literature as subserving différent fonctions, as having, 
as McCormick puts it, distinctive "implicit epistemic markers" associating 
philosophical texts with rationality and discovery and literary texts with inventi 
veness and play (66). McCormick then suggests that there is more promise in 
abandoning this enterprise of drawing distinctions and instead accepting philoso 
phy as a subgenre of literature than there is in attempting to rehabilitate the 
discredited idea of universally acceptable norms of reasons that the enterprise of 
drawing fonctional distinctions présupposés. 
Berel Lang endorses this suggestion, arguing that postmodern criticism has 
succeeded in discrediting the idea of norms of reason and in discovering 
particularized desires and rhetorical stratégies at the roots of philosophical texts. 
"[T]he supposed will for truth or wisdom in the history of philosophy is revealed 
[in the postmodern diagnosis] as no more than a disguise for nostalgia, a form 
of wistfolness and, fmally, of self-deception" (319). Yet Lang remains curiously 
guarded about what might best replace the traditional ambition and practice of 
philosophy. One strategy would be simply to embrace discontinuities and in 
consistences in our thinking and writing, or at least to rank the traditional virtues 
of consistency, coherence, and plausibility much lower than the postmodernist 
virtues of playfolness, wit, and irony. Lang worries, however, that this postmo 
dernist stance is both itself covertly philosophical, in suggesting that there is a 
right ranking of the virtues, and unserious, in denying us the possibility of 
reasoned self-responsibility. Yet the traditional terms of seriousness remain, for 
Lang, beyond rehabilitation. And so, poignantly, he is left recommending vaguely 
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described efforts to speak and write "out of context" and out of "philosophical 
wonder" at the present (330). 
David Halliburton and Mary Wiseman each urge on us more particularized 
styles of post-philosophical, postmodernist criticism. Halliburton's model of 
writing is a highly deontologized and poetic construal of Heidegger's later 
writings. Both writers and human persons are seen as complex 'fonctions,' in 
mutually constitutive interaction with such things as audience, work, and world 
fonctions. Simplifying Halliburton's baroque extravagances, the suggestion seems 
to be that persons, world, and posterity groundlessly make one another at ail 
times, so that we might best be served by entering into these makings as 
magisterially and poetically as we can, maintaining our Heideggerian historical 
remembrances ail the while. 
Mary Wiseman in contrast takes her image of writing from Barthes. The use 
of language is similarly construed as a scene of self-constituting play, where "the 
structured and structuring subject" (297) emerges, but self-satisfaction and 
originality are here to be prized more than remembrance. We must often, as 
Barthes urges us, attempt "to escape, evade, or 'cheat' the tradition" (295), which 
is composed of the expressions of the desires of others that have now become 
accreted, ossified, and inhibiting for us. Yet in cheating tradition we must match 
the successes of its Creators in expressing and satisfying their desires, so that 
tradition can serve as a sort of model for us even while we are overcoming it. Here 
Barthes' program is distinguished from that of Harold Bloom, which it otherwise 
seems to resemble, in seeing the desire for pleasure rather than for either authority 
or wisdom, as the motivating force in the continuai contestation of tradition. 
Various difficulties seem immediately to trouble these postmodernist textualist 
stances. Who is to write this newer, anti-philosophical criticism, and with what 
authority ? If this kind of criticism is somehow rationally necessitated through a 
secured understanding of the natures of philosophy and of writing, then, as Lang 
notes, postmodernism seems to share in the traditional enterprise, which it 
otherwise professes to unmask, of grounding (critical) practice in knowledge, of 
replacing informai know-how with a rationally mandated methodology of read 
ing. Alternatively, if both criticism in général and the more particularized models 
of textual analysis that are put forward stem instead only from contingent and 
unconstrained performances, then it is hard to see why we ought to take them 
seriously, unless we just happen to resonate to one or another of them. And here 
the very variety of the Derridean, de Manian, Heideggerian, and Barthesian 
critical performances suggests that there is at present no particular style of 
textualist criticism that naturally engages anyone other than the faithfol. Hallibur 
ton and Wiseman in their enactments of critical performance seem especially to 
slight this issue. Berger and Judovitz suggest reasons for their conceptions of 
criticism, but thus claim for their critical stances the traditional authority of 
reason of which they are otherwise suspicious. McCormick and Lang are 
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evidently aware of this difficulty, and as a resuit they are quite abstract and 
diffident in their suggestions about the futures of philosophy and criticism. 
In virtue of these difficulties, we might be better advised to abandon ail variants 
of postmodernist textualism and instead to entertain the idea that some modes 
of philosophical and critical practice might reasonably be regarded as more ftilly 
in the service of the acquisition of truth and the development of wisdom than their 
competitors. The difficulty in this thought is how to make it plausible while still 
accommodating the genuine historicist worries about variations in conceptions of 
truth and wisdom, and of reason and value, that have motivated the postmo 
dernist textualist stances. In what way might we now take seriously the idea of 
a discipline of wisdom ? 
2) Historical Rationalism : If one holds the view that reasoned seriousness, 
based on achieved partial understanding of persons and value, in various practices 
is still possible, then one will be inclined to acquiesce in Arthur C. Danto's 
functional démarcation of philosophy and literature. In literature, he writes, "each 
work becomes a metaphor for each reader, ... giving me to myself for each self 
peering into it" (18, 19), so that we may metaphorically see ourselves as Anna 
Karenina or Don Quixote, together with ail their contingencies of desire, culture, 
and relationship. Philosophy, in contrast, "is supposed to reveal us for what we 
are. ... This révélation is not metaphorical, however, which is why I cannot fully 
acquiesce in the thought that philosophy is literature. It continues to aim at truth, 
but when false, seriously false, it is often also so fascinatingly false as to retain a 
kind of perpetual vitality as metaphor" (23). The discourse of philosophy, in 
sometimes partially embodying essential truths, must be taken to proceed in part 
from reason, however it may be shaped by historical contingencies. 
Seeing philosophy as distinctively aimed at truth and proceeding in part from 
reason need not présupposé that there are a priori knowable methodological 
rules, uncontaminated by historical contingencies, for acquiring truth or being 
rational. Each member of the second group of contributors to Literature and the 
Question of Philosophy acknowledges the influence of the contingencies of history 
and of individual desire on conceptions of truth and reason, yet each simulta 
neously persists in the effort to sort these conceptions into the more and less 
reasonable. In the absence of a priori knowledge of the proper respective 
méthodologies of philosophy, literature, and criticism, however, these contribu 
tors take this enterprise itself to be a criticizable, desire-marked, and yet reason 
able response to the historiés of the practices of philosophy, literature, and 
criticism. Their général theoretical conceptions arise out of and are responsive to 
distinctive modes of practice, within which they have their intelligibility, rather 
than out of a founding, self-validating, intellectual intuition. As Alexander 
Nehamas writes, "it is a fruitless task ... to try to determine the nature of a 
discipline independently of its actual practice and in the hope that this nature will 
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itself determine the practice" (283). And yet conceptions of natures, and of the 
practices appropriate to them, can still be philosophically assessed for reasona 
bleness. In holding this conception of the possibility of engaged, a posteriori, 
reasoned assessment of pratices, these contributors share a commitment to the 
thesis, articulated in the général introduction by Anthony J. Cascardi, that 
"antifoundationalism does not necessarily issue in skepticism, nihilism, or the 
anxieties of indeterminacy" (xv). 
The contributors to Literature and the Question of Philosophy who take up this 
historicist rationalist stance, differ, however, both in taking différent practices as 
the primary objects of their scrutiny and criticism and in how they specifically 
conceive the place of général theorizing in relation to practice. Stanley Rosen, 
Denis Dutton, and Alexander Nehamas are principally concerned with the 
practices of literary criticism and more generally of critical reading of both literary 
and philosophical texts. Stanley Rosen nicely articulâtes the général historicist 
stance and concern with wisdom in practice that these contributors share, as he 
attacks the idea that we need a methodology of reading or a set of a priori 
knowable rules for reading that are fixed in a self-founding theory of interpréta 
tion. The various new methods of reading that are put forward by the committed 
textualists (Berger, Judovitz, Halliburton, and Wiseman, and behind them de 
Man, Derrida, Heidegger, and Barthes) are thus stigmatized as subjectivist 
impositions divorced from a flourishing traditional practice of interprétation. 
"The obsession with method [that is now common among literary theorists] is 
a sublimated form of the desire for the absolute" (214). Instead of a new method, 
what we need is a recovery of "the pretheoretical talent of natural reason 
(sometimes called phronësis)" (239) as it has been expressed within traditional 
practices. (The textualists would replay that there is no such unified tradition of 
interpretive practice to be recovered.) 
At this level of abstraction, Rosen's account of contemporary interprétation 
theory's refusai of a possible recovery of reason expressed in practice is an 
attractive and plausible diagnosis of its ills. Whether this recovery can genuinely 
be achieved and sustained, however, will depend on how we are or are not able 
to see concrete and specific continuities throughout the history of interpretive 
practices. Both Denis Dutton and Alexander Nehamas attempt to point to such 
concrete continuities in the practices of reading in général. Dutton argues that we 
generally do receive and understand literary works (together with artifacts in 
général) as products of intentional acts. And not only do we in fact do this, we 
furthermore have good reasons for doing this. Though what can be intended is 
itself shaped by prevailing conventions, it does not follow that ail interprétation 
depends upon an unconstrained choice of conventions on the part of the reader. 
Instead, "we will allow in court only the meanings that the words might possibly 
have had [for the author who intentionally produced them]" (216). We read by 
attending to the conventions of usage that might historically have been intention 
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ally used by authors (sometimes in novel ways). Intentionalist criteria thus 
establish "categorial frameworks for understanding" (199), and it is natural and 
reasonable to make use of them. This argument seems entirely sound. The only 
objection to which it is open is that there are no stable and univocally intelligible 
conventions of use to be intended by anyone. Language, a textualist might urge, 
inevitably makes the coherent expression of intendings impossible. But it is hard 
to see how this textualist response could be meant seriously. 
Alexander Nehamas's essay both compléments and opposes Denis Dutton's, 
as Nehamas focuses on the différence between being an agent or author, a 
self-conscious center of meaning and intending, or one who creates an artifact, 
and a mere historical person, a writer, or an unself-conscious efficient cause of 
physical events. Nehamas argues compellingly that there is a definitional 
connection between works and authors : it is agentive authors, not mere efficient 
causes, to whom we attribute works, those collections of marks that we regard as 
created artifacts possessing significance. Somewhat perversely, Nehamas then 
suggests that it is our free interpretive activity that creates both author and work 
out of mere historical writer and insignificant mark. Here one wants to object that 
ordinary, materially located persons are themselves agents and authors, and that, 
using the resources of a language, they create significant marks that stand as 
works and call for our interprétation. Kafka, one might say, would have remained 
an author, albeit an unknown one, even if his writings had never come to light 
and been read and interpreted. One further salutary eflfect of Nehamas's essay, 
however, is that he calls attention to the interest that literature has for us in 
making manifest possible characters for agentive persons, in showing us various 
ways in which we might specifically express and develop our own self-conscious 
ness and senses of value as persons, not mere things. 
This theme of how possibilities of character are marked out for us by literature 
lies at the hearts of the remaining essays in Literature and the Question of 
Philosophy, those by Martha Craven Nussbaum, Charles Altieri, Anthony J. 
Cascardi, and Arthur C. Danto. Martha Craven Nussbaum argues that "our 
ethical task" in attempting to live coherently, expressively, and well resembles 
"the task of the literary artist" in attempting to fashion a coherent narrative 
account of the best possibilities for certain protagonists and of how their 
capacities may help or hinder them in realizing them (169). Perhaps, she 
suggests, there is even "more than analogy" here : the skill of envisioning 
possibilities and capacities for protagonists that novelists must employ are the 
very skills we must have if we are to live well. Exemplary exercices of this skill 
will have an improvisatory quality, in being responsive to particular desires, 
situations, needs, and relationships in and among individual persons, fictive or 
real, yet at the same time will be constrained by what Nussbaum calls the standing 
terms of morality, by principles of duty and responsibility that may properly 
receive général articulation through abstract philosophical reflection. "Perception 
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without responsibility is dangerously free-floating, even as duty without percep 
tion is blunt and blind" (178). Instead what is needed is a "Loving dialogue" 
between perception and principle (178). The possibility and importance of 
achieving such a loving dialogue are illustrated through a careful reading of a late 
scene in Henry James's The Golden Bowl, in which Maggie Verver and her father, 
Adam, "give one another up" (170) into their respective marriages, because that 
is best thing that is then possible for her, and so for him. It is not possible to 
scrutinize here the détails of Nussbaum's compelling account of this achievement. 
It may well be arguable against this account that this achievement is too litle and 
too late, in arising out of and reinforcing well-established manipulative relations 
with others, relations that might and ought to have been avoided much earlier. 
(A reply to this criticism would then be that our best achievements must always 
be flawed in ways that resemble the failings of Maggie's and Adam's.) But even 
to take up this line would be to support, not undermine, Nussbaum's général 
conception of the proper relations between perceptions and principles, and 
between literature and moral philosophy, for this line of criticism would acknowl 
edge that "the moral rôle of rules themselves ... can only be shown inside a story 
that situâtes rules in their appropriate place vis-à-vis perceptions" (184), showing 
us how they may be acknowledged and creatively used in particular situations in 
fiirtherance of living well. Here philosophy, with its concem for principles, and 
literature, with its concern for particulars, are convincingly argued to be well 
practiced in continuous relation to one another, even if they remain distinct. 
This theme is continued in the essays of Charles Altieri and Anthony J. 
Cascardi, with Altieri emphasizing the contingency and performativity of the act 
or process of achieving understanding and living well, and Cascardi emphasizing 
the stable content of any such achievement. Altieri thus focuses, as the editor 
observes, on the dynamics of "individual 'alignment' with those goods that 
require universal acceptance" (133), plausibly arguing that such alignments can 
never be perfect or completed. This in turn leads him to prefer an Aristotelian 
conception of multiple and shilling ethical virtues to a Kantian morality of 
universal principle. We should attempt, he thinks, to make our valuings and 
actings articulate, legible, beautiful, sublime, or "noncategorically intelligible" 
(150), rather than above ail dutiful. But it is perhaps arguable, as Nussbaum 
suggests, that there remains a fundamental place in our lives for the standing 
terms, the Kantian principles of duty, even if Altieri is also right about the 
nonclosing and performative character of our specific valuings and actings. 
Along these Unes, Anthony J. Cascardi is concerned to show, and to mark out 
how literature helps to show, the place and worth of something like Kantian 
morality in human life. Kant himself, it is argued, failed to establish this, in 
distinguishing and separating phénoménal nature and causality from noumenal 
freedom and morality. Kant's late efforts in The Critique of Judgment to lead us, 
through the experiences of beauty and sublimity and through reflection on them, 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Wed, 19 Aug 2015 19:47:58 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
168 ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS 
to see phénoménal nature as itself an expression of a supersensible, noumenal 
reality, thereby healing the breach between them, do not carry us far enough. This 
insight remains, for Kant, something achieved in the mind alone, something 
aesthetically subjective, not something certifiably stemming from the way things 
are. We need, then, a more authentic and natural way of locating morality in 
nature, in relation to natural human desires and passions. Cascardi then takes as 
an emblem of the natural reconciliation of passion and morality the faithiul 
marriage of Leontes and Hermione that is achieved, after the overcoming of 
Leontes's unnatural jealousies, at the end of Shakespeare's The Winters Tale. 
Moral lawMness and naturalness here coïncide, as passion is directed to its best 
objects, in "their (re)creation of the conjugal" (128). One might, with Altieri, 
wonder how conclusive such an achievement can be — notice Cascardi's carefal 
"(re)" - but its value as an object of aspiration is here compellingly portrayed. 
These essays of Nussbaum, Altieri, and Cascardi stand together at the forefront 
of the most exciting, important, original, and serious recent work both in 
post-foundational moral philosophy and in literary theory. This work is nicely 
juxtaposed in Literature and the Question of Philosophy with the more skeptical 
essays of the postmodernist textualists. In surviving textualist criticisms, while 
still taking historicist worries about the influence of contingencies on ail reading, 
writing, imagining, and thinking into account, they show (as Danto suggests in 
his méditation on its practice) that philosophy, as the disciplined effort to 
understand the nature of things thence to live fitly and well, is possible - not in 
pure autonomy, not in analysis or the theory of reference, not in the theory of 
criticism prior to practice, but in relation to serious attention to narratives of the 
pressures of the particular on understanding, valuing, and acting. 
Richard Eldridge. 
Keith Seddon, Time, a philosophical treatment, Croom Helm, London, New 
York, Sydney, 1987, 166 p. 
Le temps est à la mode en cette décennie finissante. Après la Société belge de 
Philosophie les 11 et 12 décembre 1987, c'est Y Association des Sociétés de 
Philosophie de Langue Française qui y consacre son XXIIe congrès du 29 au 
31 août 1988. Dans ce contexte, le petit livre de K. Seddon nous apporte le 
rafraîchissement d'un vent du large, et plus précisément d'Outre-Atlantique. Quoi 
de plus éloigné, en eifet, de l'heidegerro-manie continentale, que la réflexion 
quasi-thérapeutique (') de notre auteur sur les problèmes du temps ? 
Le livre reprend, de façon parfois un peu superficielle, l'analyse de la plus 
grande partie des problèmes temporels qui ont retenu l'attention des philosophes 
( 1 ) 
' 
Treatment', nous dit le Webster, signifie entre autre, et c'est dans ce sens qu'il doit 
être entendu dans le titre de K. Seddon, 'management in the application of remedies'. 
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